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CASENOTE
ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: THE COURT'S FAILURE TO
RECOGNIZE WHAT LIES BENEATH
[Determination of a person's incapacity] is a matter of great diffi-
culty, partly from the easiness of counterfeiting this disability...
and partly from the variety of the degrees of this infirmity, whereof
some are sufficient, and some are insufficient to excuse persons in
capital offenses.
Yet the law of England hath afforded the best method of trial,
that is possible, of this and all other matters of fact, namely, by a
jury of twelve men all concurring in the same judgment, by the tes-
timony of witnesses.. ., and by the inspection and direction of the
judge.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The common law excluded "idiots" and "lunatics" from punish-
ment for criminal acts.2 The Supreme Court of the United States
initially fortified the common law rule in Ford v. Wainwright,3
holding that the Eighth Amendment4 prohibits execution of the
insane.5 It is to the other side of the common law that this
1. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2268 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 1
SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 32-33 (Philadelphia,
Robert H. Small 1847).
2. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989).
3. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.") (emphasis added).
5. Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
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casenote turns: the diminished capacity of the mentally retarded
as it applies to punishment for crimes. Under the common law,
"the term 'idiot' was generally used to describe persons who had a
total lack of reason or understanding, or an inability to distin-
guish between good and evil."6 This definition of "idiocy" is simi-
lar to the modern term "mental retardation."7 It is important to
note, however, that idiots under the common law were persons
with such severe disability that they completely lacked the rea-
soning capacity necessary to distinguish between good and evil or
form criminal intent.' This level of mental incapacity corresponds
with the "severe" or "profound" retardation categories recognized
under modern psychiatric medicine.9
At the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, the law al-
lowed the punishment and execution of individuals who were
mentally retarded so long as they did not reach the level of idiocy
described above.1" The question has arisen, though, as to whether
it is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment
to allow the execution of the mentally retarded. The Supreme
Court first addressed this issue in Penry v. Lynaugh, holding that
such executions were not in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 1
6. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331-32.
7. Id. at 332. Mental retardation is defined as "a lifelong condition of impaired or in-
complete mental development characterized by three criteria: significantly sub-average
intellectual functioning; concurrent and related limitation in two or more adaptive skill
areas; and manifestation of symptoms before age eighteen." Aimee D. Borromeo, Mental
Retardation and the Death Penalty, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 175, 178 (2002) (citing American
Association on Mental Retardation, Definition of Mental Retardation, available at
http://www.aamr.orgPolicies/faq-mental-retardation.shtml (last visited Mar. 21, 2003).
Similarly, the American Psychiatric Association's definition requires significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, onset before age eighteen, and significant adaptive
functioning limitation in at least two skill areas, including "communication, self-care,
home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, func-
tional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety." Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2245 n.3.
8. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333.
9. Id. For a person to be diagnosed as mentally retarded, he or she must have an IQ
of seventy or less. Id. at 308 n.1. The American Association on Mental Retardation classi-
fies "mild" retardation as an IQ score between fifty to fifty-five and seventy. Id. "Moderate"
retardation includes individuals scoring between thirty-five to forty and fifty to fifty-five.
Id. Individuals are categorized as "severely" retarded if they score between twenty to
twenty-five and thirty-five to forty. Id. "Profoundly" retarded individuals have IQ scores
less than twenty or twenty-five. Id.
10. See id. at 333.
11. See id. at 335.
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The Court recently overturned the Penry ruling however, in At-
kins v. Virginia.1
2
In Section II, this casenote reviews precedent relevant to the
Atkins holding. In Section III, this casenote depicts the facts of
Atkins and summarizes the majority and dissenting opinions in
that case. Section IV provides a discussion of Atkins in light of the
Eighth Amendment and a discussion of the validity of the Court's
analysis. Finally, Section V concludes that the Atkins decision,
while appearing straightforward on its face, actually enhances
and ignores several underlying issues regarding the punishment
of the mentally retarded.
II. DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE
MENTALLY RETARDED
A. The Jury's Responsibilities at Sentencing
Traditionally, the decision whether or not a mentally retarded
offender should receive the death penalty was left to the jury.13 In
Lockett v. Ohio,4 the Supreme Court held that the sentencer
could "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the cir-
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
for a sentence less than death." 5 In simpler terms, the Court held
that the jury could consider mitigating factors when determining
sentencing verdicts.16 Such mitigating factors include, but are not
limited to, "Itlhe defendant's character, prior criminal history,
mental capacity, background, and age." 7 Soon after Lockett, in
Eddings v. Oklahoma,"8 the Court held that "Ulust as the State
may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any
mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as
12. 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002).
13. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 319.
14. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
15. Id. at 604.
16. See id.
17. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 163 (1994).
18. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence."19 Thus, the
jury was required to consider a defendant's mental retardation as
a mitigating factor under the Court's holding in Eddings.2 °
The Court's ruling in California v. Brown2 further clarified the
principles stated in Lockett and Eddings.22 Essentially, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that punishment should be correlative to cul-
pability asserting that "the sentence imposed at the penalty stage
should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant's back-
ground, character, and crime."23
B. Penry v. Lynaugh: Execution of the Mentally Retarded Is
Permissible
In 1989, the jury determination system was questioned.24 Penry
v. Lynaugh asked the Supreme Court of the United States to de-
termine whether the execution of the mentally retarded was a per
se violation of the Eighth Amendment.2" The defendant in that
case argued that he was sentenced to death because the jury was
not adequately instructed to consider all of the mitigating fac-
tors.26 The Court held that execution of the mentally retarded was
not cruel and unusual punishment, effectively continuing the
practice of considering mental retardation merely as a mitigating
factor.27
1. History of the Penry Case
In Penry, the defendant, Johnny Paul Penry, brutally raped,
beat, and stabbed a woman with a pair of scissors while in her
19. Id. at 113-14.
20. See id. at 105.
21. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
22. See id. at 545 ("Lockett and Eddings reflect the belief that punishment should be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.") (O'Connor, J., con-
curring).
23. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
25. Id. at 313.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 335.
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home.2" The victim died several hours later, but was able to de-
scribe her assailant before her death.2 9 Her description led the po-
lice to suspect Penry, who later made two confessions to the po-
lice.3 ' As a result, Penry was charged with capital murder."
Prior to trial, at Penry's competency hearing, Dr. Jerome
Brown, a clinical psychologist, testified that Penry was mentally
retarded. Penry's condition was likely due to trauma to the
brain at birth, and IQ testing prior to the murder revealed Penry
"as having an IQ between [fifty] and [sixty-three], which indicates
mild to moderate retardation."3 Testing conducted by Dr. Brown
prior to trial showed Penry as having an IQ of fifty-four.34 Dr.
Brown's evaluation also concluded that Penry had the mental age
of a six-and-a-half-year-old, even though he was twenty-two years
old at the time of the crime.35 Despite Dr. Brown's testimony,
"[t]he jury found Penry competent to stand trial."36
At trial, Penry raised an insanity defense and presented testi-
mony from Dr. Jose Garcia.37 Dr. Garcia, a psychiatrist, testified
that "Penry suffered from organic brain damage and moderate re-
tardation, which resulted in poor impulse control and an inability
to learn from experience."3' Dr. Garcia diagnosed Penry as suffer-
ing from organic brain disorder while committing the offense,
which kept him from acting as a lawful citizen and understanding
the wrongfulness of his conduct.39
28. Id. at 307.
29. Id.
30. Id. Penry was on parole following his conviction on an earlier rape charge. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 307-08.
34. Id. at 308.
35. Id. Dr. Brown's conclusion as to Penry's mental age suggested that Penry "ha[d]
the ability to learn and the learning or the knowledge of the average [six-and-a-half-year-
old] kid." Id. Moreover, Dr. Brown's testimony revealed his opinion that "Penry's social
maturity, or ability to function in the world, was that of a [nine or ten]-year-old." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Dr. Garcia indicated that Penry's brain damage likely resulted at birth, but
acknowledged that the illness could have resulted from beatings and brain injuries at an
early age. Id. at 308-09.
39. Id. at 309.
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The prosecution presented testimony from two psychiatrists,
Dr. Kenneth Vogtsberger and Dr. Felix Peebles." Dr. Vogtsberger
testified that "although Penry was a person of limited mental
ability, he was not suffering from any mental illness or defect at
the time of the crime, and that he knew the difference between
right and wrong and had the potential to honor the law."41 Dr.
Vogtsberger conceded that Penry was impulsive, tended to break
the law, and appeared unable to learn from experience, but ar-
gued that these problems were due to Penry's antisocial personal-
ity. 2 In addition, Dr. Vogtsberger testified that Penry's IQ scores
did not indicate his true ability as those scores underestimated
both Penry's understanding of the world around him and his
alertness. 3
Dr. Peebles testified that Penry had an anti-social personality
and that Penry was legally sane when he committed the crime.4
Dr. Peebles had previous experience with Penry, as he had diag-
nosed Penry in both 1973 and 1977 as being mentally retarded. 5
Both of the State's psychiatrists "acknowledged that Penry was a
person of extremely limited mental ability, and that he seemed
unable to learn from his mistakes."46
Rejecting Penry's insanity defense, the jury found Penry guilty
of capital murder and sentenced him to death.4 ' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on two issues, including whether it is
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 310.
47. Id. at 310-11. In deciding the sentence to impose on Penry, the jury was required
by Texas law to answer three questions:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the de-
ceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
the death of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evi-
dence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was un-
reasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
Id. at 310. (quoting TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 and Supp.
1989)). Under this statutory requirement, if the jury answers "yes" to all three special is-
sues, the defendant must be sentenced to death, but if the jury does not answer "yes" to all
three questions, the defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.
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"cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to
execute a mentally retarded person with Penry's reasoning abil-
ity."4" Penry pointed to several factors, arguing that the execution
of the mentally retarded is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.49 First, Penry argued that the disabilities of the
mentally retarded leave them without the moral culpability nec-
essary to justify the death penalty.5" In addition, Penry argued
that application of the death penalty for the mentally retarded
should be considered cruel and unusual punishment due to an
"emerging national consensus" against such executions." The
State responded by arguing that existing procedural safeguards
served to adequately protect the mentally retarded and that no
national consensus existed which would support a ban against
executing the mentally retarded.52
2. The Court Rejects Penry's Argument
The Court reiterated the fact that under the common law, exe-
cution of the mentally retarded-at least those not severely re-
tarded-was considered legal.53 The Court acknowledged that
"[tihe prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment are not limited...
to those practices condemned" at the time the Constitution was
ratified,54 stating that "the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments also recognizes the 'evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."'55 Thus, in ques-
tioning whether the Eighth Amendment precluded execution of
the mentally retarded, the Court considered Penry's argument
48. Id. at 313. The Court also granted certiorari to determine whether Penry "[was]
sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the jury was not ade-
quately instructed to take into consideration all of his mitigating evidence and because the
terms in the Texas special issues were not defined in such a way that the jury could con-
sider and give effect to his mitigating evidence in answering them." Id. For a listing of the
Texas special issues, see supra note 47. See also Penry, 492 U.S. at 328 (discussing the
Court's holding regarding the jury instructions).
49. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328-29.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 329.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 331-32.
54. Id. at 330 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)).
55. Id. at 330-31 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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that there was in fact an emerging national consensus against
such punishment.56 The Court found that no such national con-
sensus existed, as only two states had legislation banning execu-
tion of the mentally retarded." The Court briefly pointed out that
in order to find national consensus, it was necessary to find a
greater number of states with similar legislation." Thus, as there
was no national consensus, execution of the mentally retarded
was found constitutional.59
3. Penry's Effect
Following Penry, the United States Congress banned execution
of mentally retarded federal defendants. ° Moreover, Tennessee
became the first state to pass legislation abolishing execution of
the mentally retarded in reaction to the Penry holding.61 Eighteen
states, in total, enacted statutes restricting the application of the
death penalty regarding the mentally retarded.62 However, eleven
of the statutes enacted were not retroactive and applied only to
those offenders committing crimes after the effective date of the
legislation. Due to this change in the legislative arena-the re-
duced availability of the death penalty as it applies to mentally
retarded offenders-the Court was pressed to reconsider whether
56. See id. at 333-34.
57. Id. at 334. At the time arguments were heard in Penry, only Georgia banned exe-
cution of the mentally retarded. Id. Maryland had enacted a statute banning execution of
the mentally retarded, but it was not slated to take effect until July, 1989. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 335.
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2000).
61. Cynthia Han, "Evolving Standards of Decency" Legislative and Judicial Develop-
ments Leading to Atkins v. Virginia, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 469, 470 (2002).
62. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2248-49 (2002). Five states enacted legislation
regarding the susceptibility to the death penalty of the mentally retarded in 2001. Han,
supra note 61, at 470. For an example of the statutes enacted after Penry, see FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.137(8) (West Supp. 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.140 (Michie 1999); and
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-203(b) (1997).
63. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2261-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, two of the stat-
utes enacted to restrict the execution of the mentally retarded actually allow such execu-
tions under certain circumstances. Id. at 2262 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, a men-
tally retarded convict committing murder while in prison is eligible for the death penalty
in New York. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27.12(d) (Con-
sol. 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (Consol. 1998)). Kansas restricts execution of only the
severely mentally retarded. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referencing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
21-4623(d)-(e), 2 1-4631(c) (1995)).
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the Eighth Amendment bans the execution of the mentally re-
tarded.64
III. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA: THE COURT BANS EXECUTION OF THE
MENTALLY RETARDED
A. History of the Atkins Case
On August 16, 1996, Daryl Atkins and William Jones robbed a
customer at a convenience store.65 Armed with a semiautomatic
handgun, they abducted Eric Nesbitt, robbed him, forced him to
withdraw additional money from an automated teller machine,
and took him to an "isolated location" where they ordered him out
of the vehicle and shot him eight times.66 Upon arrest, Jones de-
clined to make an initial statement to the police. 67 Although At-
kins made an initial statement to the police, it differed greatly
and was substantially inconsistent with his later testimony at
trial.68 Both Jones and Atkins were indicted for capital murder af-
ter their arrest, but the prosecution later allowed Jones to plead
guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for his testimony
against Atkins at trial.69 During Atkins's trial, both Jones and
Atkins testified as to the details of the incident.7" The two defen-
dants' testimonies were substantially similar regarding their ac-
tions on the night of August 16-the one exception being that
each asserted the other had shot and killed Nesbitt.71 The jury be-
lieved Jones's testimony to be true and found Atkins guilty of
capital murder for killing Nesbitt."
During the penalty phase of Atkins's trial, the prosecution pre-
sented evidence regarding Atkins's "future dangerousness and
the 'vileness of the offense' committed.73 In an effort to prove fu-
64. See id. at 2248-50.
65. Id. at 2244.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2245 n.2.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2244 n.1.
70. Id. at 2244.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2244-45.
73. Id. at 2245.
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ture dangerousness, the prosecution presented evidence of At-
kins's prior felony convictions and testimony from the victims of
his other robberies and assaults.74 Atkins had "[sixteen] prior fel-
ony convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, abduction, use of
a firearm, and maiming."75 In order to prove the "vileness of the
offense," the Commonwealth relied on the trial record, which in-
cluded an autopsy report and pictures of the victim's body.76
The defense, on the other hand, relied solely on the testimony
of one witness during the penalty phase of Atkins's trial, Dr.
Evan Nelson.77 Dr. Nelson, a forensic psychologist, testified that
Atkins was 'mildly mentally retarded."'7 8 Dr. Nelson also stated
that, "in his opinion, Atkins'[s].'limited intellect had been a con-
sistent feature throughout his life, and that his IQ score of [fifty-
nine] is not an 'aberration, malingered result, or invalid test
score."'79 After weighing the evidence presented by the Common-
wealth and the defense during the penalty phase of Atkins's trial,
the jury sentenced Atkins to death."
Due to a misleading verdict form, however, the Supreme Court
of Virginia overturned the verdict and ordered a second sentenc-
ing hearing.8 ' Once again, the defense presented Dr. Nelson to
testify during the penalty phase. 2 He testified that Atkins "was a
'slow learne [r],' who showed a 'lack of success in pretty much
every domain of his life' and that he had an 'impaired' capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his con-
duct to the law."8 3 In addition, the defense presented several of
Atkins's family members to testify that he was a "'follower."'4
74. Id. One of Atkins's prior victims described how Atkins hit him over the head with
a beer bottle, while another victim told the jury how Atkins "slapped a gun across [her]
face, clubbed her in the head with it, knocked her to the ground, and then helped her up,
only to shoot her in the stomach." Id. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2245.
77. Id.
78. Id. Dr. Nelson based his conclusion on his review of education and judicial records,
discussions with people who knew Atkins, and Atkins's tested IQ of fifty-nine. Id.
79. Id. at 2245 n.5.
80. Id. at 2245.
81. Id. at 2245-46.
82. Id. at 2246.
83. Id. at 2259-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
84. Id. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1194
ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
The Commonwealth introduced an expert rebuttal witness, Dr.
Stanton Samenow, who testified that no evidence, aside from the
IQ score, indicated, that Atkins, was mentally retarded. 5
Samenow also testified that Atkins was at least of average intel-
ligence. 6 Once again, the jury sentenced Atkins to death, and this
time the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the sentence.87 In
response to Atkins's argument that the death penalty should not
apply to him due to his mental retardation, the Supreme Court of
Virginia relied on Penry8 and stated that it was "not willing to
commute Atkins'[s] sentence of death to life imprisonment merely
because of his IQ score."89
Justice Hassell and Justice Koontz dissented due to their con-
clusion that imposition of the death penalty was excessive for a
mentally retarded defendant with the mental age of a young
child.9 ° They asserted that mentally retarded individuals are less
culpable for their criminal acts, at least to some degree, due to
their mental limitations.91 They further stated that "[a] moral and
civilized society diminishes itself if its system of justice does not
afford recognition and consideration of those limitations in a
meaningful way."92
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Stevens, reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia in finding that the execution of the mentally retarded was
indeed cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment-a holding that effectively overturned Penry-and
remanded the case for further proceedings.9"
85. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Dr. Samenow based his opinion on several factors, in-
cluding review of Atkins's school records, two interviews with Atkins, and discussions with
correctional facility staff. Id. at 2246 n.6. Admittedly, Dr. Samenow did not give Atkins an
intelligence test, but he did incorporate and "ask ... questions taken from the 1972 ver-
sion of the Wechsler Memory Scale." Id.
87. Id. at 2246.
88. See supra Part II.B for further discussion of Penry.
89. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (2000).
90. Id. at 323-24.
91. Id. at 325.
92. Id.
93. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. at 2242, 2252 (2002).
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B. Majority Opinion
1. A Test To Determine Whether Punishment Is Excessive
Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and de-
livered an opinion in which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.94 In considering whether the execu-
tion of the mentally retarded violated the Eighth Amendment,
the Court found it necessary to lay out a framework in which to
review the issue.95 Referring to Weems v. United States,96 in which
the Court ruled that punishment must be graduated and propor-
tioned to the initial offense,97 the Court stated that it had "read
the text of the [Eighth] [A]mendment to prohibit all excessive
punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that
may or may not be excessive."9" The Court then asserted that
when determining whether a punishment is excessive, it is neces-
sary to apply modern standards rather than the standards which
existed when the Eighth Amendment was adopted.99 The Court
clarified this point, indicating that in order to determine today's
standard one must look to objective evidence.' 0 Despite the im-
portance of objective evidence, however, the Court concluded that
objective evidence alone does not determine the answer.0 1 The
Court reasoned that "'the Constitution contemplates that in the
end [the Court's] judgment will be brought to bear on the ques-
tion of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment.""0' 2 According to the Court, their judgment is
brought to bear "by asking whether there is reason to disagree
with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators. '"1 3
Thus, the Court found it necessary to first consider objective fac-
94. Id. at 2244.
95. See id. at 2247.
96. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
97. Id. at 367.
98. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2246, n.7.
99. Id. at 2247. Specifically, the Court cited Trop v. Dulles, in which Chief Justice
Warren stated that "[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
100. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
103. Id. at 2247-48.
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tors in determining the existence of a national consensus and to
next bring their own judgment to "bear" on the issue.104
2. A Finding of National Consensus
Acknowledging the Penry finding of no national consensus
against the eligibility of the mentally retarded for the death pen-
alty, 105 the Court concluded that many changes have occurred
since Penry.106 The Court opined that the best evidence of society's
contemporary values is legislation enacted by state and national
legislatures.0 7 Reviewing legislative action since Penry, the Court
found that eighteen states now have statutes restricting the use
of the death penalty for the mentally retarded."0 ' In the Court's
view, "[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is sig-
nificant, but the consistency of the direction of change."10 9 The
Court found such actions to provide evidence that today's society
believes mentally retarded offenders are less culpable than aver-
age criminals."0 Moreover, the Court acknowledged that "even in
those States which allow execution of mentally retarded offend-
ers, the practice is uncommon."' Pointing to the increased en-
actment of legislation, the rare use of the death penalty for the
mentally retarded, the views indicated by religious and private
organizations, other nations, and public opinion polls, the Court
found a national consensus against the application of the death
penalty to mentally retarded offenders." 2
3. The Justices Bring Their Judgment To "Bear" on the Issue
Next, the Court turned to the second part of their overall
framework-bringing their own judgment to "bear" on the is-
sue."' Immediately, the Court turned to the reason behind the
104. Id. at 2248.
105. Id. at 2248 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2247 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).
108. Id. at 2248-49.
109. Id. at 2249.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2249 n.21.
113. See id. at 2250-52.
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disagreement surrounding the issue."1 The Court suggested that
dispute over the execution of mentally retarded offenders is in
fact due to the difficulty in determining whether or not an of-
fender is mentally retarded. 115 In an effort to resolve the problems
inherent in such determinations, the Court stated:
Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired
as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about
whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v.
Wainwright, with regard to insanity, "we leave to the State[s] the
task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional re-
striction upon its execution of sentences."
116
The Court also discussed whether there was any reason to dis-
agree with the apparent national consensus.117 Discussing the de-
ficiencies of mentally retarded persons-including diminished ca-
pacity to understand, communicate, learn from mistakes, and
control impulses-the Court found that "[t]heir deficiencies do not
warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do di-
minish their personal culpability.""' Considering the aforemen-
tioned deficiencies of the mentally retarded, the Court found that
death penalty jurisprudence provided two reasons to follow the
national consensus and exempt the mentally retarded from the
death penalty. 19 Those two reasons are: (1) the retributive and
deterrent justifications recognized as a basis for the death pen-
alty may not apply to mentally retarded offenders,12 ° and (2) men-
tally retarded offenders bear an enhanced risk that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty will occur despite mitigating factors that
call for a less severe punishment.1 2'
First, the Court found that retribution does not justify execut-
ing the mentally retarded since retribution requires punishment
which increases in severity with an offender's culpability. 22 Recit-
ing the fact that the death penalty is confined to only the most
serious crimes, the Court suggested that "[i]f the culpability of
the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme
114. See id. at 2250.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)).
117. See id. at 2250.
118. Id. at 2250-51.
119. Id. at 2251.
120. Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
121. Id. (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
122. Id.
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average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanc-
tion available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally
retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribu-
tion. 1 2
3
In addition, the Court suggested that the deterrence require-
ment is not met in applying the death penalty to the mentally re-
tarded.124 The deficiencies of the mentally retarded which make
them less culpable "also make it less likely that they can process
the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as
a result, control their conduct based upon that information."'25
The Court opined that because the goal of the death penalty is to
deter offenders from committing capital crimes, its use among the
mentally retarded is not necessary or beneficial, as mentally re-
tarded offenders are unlikely to understand the consequences of
their actions or to act accordingly with that knowledge. 126 Fi-
nally, the Court found that "the possibility of false confessions...
[and] the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a
persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evi-
dence of one or more aggravating factors," coupled with the fact
that mentally retarded defendants are less capable of assisting
their counsel and are usually poor witnesses, increases the risk of
imposition of the death penalty in unwarranted situations.127 For
the reasons cited above, the Court held that there was no basis on
which to disagree with the national consensus to abolish the
death penalty for the mentally retarded, and accordingly ruled
that such punishment was excessive and unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment. 2 '
C. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.'29 Specifically, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion to point out the problems
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2251-52.
128. Id. at 2252.
129. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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inherent in the Court's decision to consider foreign laws, the
views of professional and religious organizations, and opinion
polls in determining the presence of a national consensus."' Chief
Justice Rehnquist asserted that if the Court is attempting to as-
sess whether or not there is a national consensus, it is not neces-
sary to look at viewpoints from other countries, nor is it sup-
ported by precedent. 131 In addition, he referred to several factors
suggesting that opinion polls should not be considered, including
the reduced reliability and validity of opinion polls.132 He also
suggested that the particular polls reviewed by the Court in At-
kins should not be considered as evidence for a national consen-
sus, because the Court had no knowledge of the targeted popula-
tion, specificity of questions, or background reasons for
conducting the polls. 133 Moreover, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
view, the opinion-based evidence relied on by the Court should
not "be accorded any weight on the Eight [sic] Amendment scale
when the elected representatives of a State's populace have not
deemed them persuasive enough to prompt legislative action.' 34
Regarding determination of a national consensus, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that in order to determine today's standard of
decency, one should look only to the actions of legislatures and ju-
ries. '35 Chief Justice Rehnquist based this opinion, in part, on the
idea that "'in a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are
constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral
values of the people.""36 Chief Justice Rehnquist also disagreed
with the majority's finding of national consensus based upon
state statutes imposing restrictions on the execution of mentally
retarded offenders. 37 While conceding that eighteen states re-
cently passed such laws, he noted that twenty other states do not
have similar laws and leave the sentencing determination up to
130. Id. at 2252-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2254-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2255 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In an appendix to the opinion, he pro-
vided examples of the polls presented to the Court as evidence of a national consensus
against execution of the mentally retarded. See id. at 2256-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing).
134. Id. at 2255 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2256 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
175-76 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972))).
137. Id. at 2252 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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the factfinder, who is more familiar with the defendant's case and
capabilities. 3 ' Basically, Chief Justice Rehnquist's theory hinges
on the assertion that a national consensus cannot exist where
only a minority of the state legislatures allowing capital punish-
ment have acted to limit its application for the mentally infirm.139
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for fail-
ing to review jury sentences for mentally retarded offenders.14 °
Conceding that jury sentences are entitled to less weight than
legislative actions,"' he maintained that the actions of juries are
a reliable indicator of the contemporary views of society.14 1 Since
Atkins introduced no evidence concerning mentally retarded jury
sentences, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority did
not consider juries as a relevant indicator of contemporary val-
ues-thereby ignoring one of the two sources that actually indi-
cate whether or not there is a national consensus regarding
Eighth Amendment issues.43
D. Justice Scalia's Dissent
1. National Consensus Lacking
Justice Scalia filed a separate dissenting opinion in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined.'44 Justice
Scalia asserted that the majority's declaration of a national con-
sensus further reinforced the "death-is-different" approach taken
by the Court in the context of Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence. 145 Reciting the fact that only severely retarded offenders
were excluded from the death penalty under common law at the
time of the Eighth Amendment's creation,146 Justice Scalia opined
that there is no national consensus suggesting that all mentally
138. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
139. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 2254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
142. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (finding that a jury's close relationship with a
trial provides an illustrative link between modern societal values and the justice system).
143. See id. at 2253-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2259 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2260 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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retarded individuals should be exempted from the death penalty,
and that the majority's ruling was founded solely upon the Jus-
tices' personal opinions on the matter.'47 While agreeing that ob-
jective factors were the only appropriate considerations in deter-
mining whether there was a national consensus, Justice Scalia
disagreed with the majority's interpretation of such factors. 48
First, Justice Scalia reviewed the legislative actions examined
by the majority in making its determination.'49 Although eighteen
states had enacted legislation restricting the use of the death
penalty for the mentally retarded, Justice Scalia argued that such
actions did not indicate a national consensus. 5 ° Reasons given for
this conclusion included: (1) that the states enacting such legisla-
tion comprise only forty-seven percent of the thirty-eight states
that allow capital punishment;15" ' (2) only seven of the states en-
acting legislation prohibit execution of the mentally retarded in
all instances;52 (3) the referenced state legislation is so recent
that the states themselves have not had an adequate opportunity
to review the validity of the overall scheme through practice;5 3
and (4) the Supreme Court has generally required a greater indi-
cation of national consensus before finding that contemporary
values dictate the Eighth Amendment's abolition of a punish-
ment. 114
In addition, Justice Scalia questioned the majority's assertion
that a national consensus could be determined by examining the
rarity of the imposition of the death penalty on the mentally re-
tarded in states allowing their execution.15 5 Accordingly, Justice
Scalia contended that even the evidence cited by the majority was
unclear on whether or not the execution of the mentally retarded
is "uncommon."56 Justice Scalia suggested that even if execution
of the mentally retarded is uncommon, there are two primary fac-
tors which make it so: the fact that the mentally retarded com-
147. See id. at 2265 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 2260-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 2261-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 2261-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2261 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 2262-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2262 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 2264 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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prise only one to three percent of society and the fact that "mental
retardation is a constitutionally mandated mitigating factor at
sentencing."15 Thus, Justice Scalia asserted that one would ex-
pect juries rarely to impose the death penalty against mentally
retarded offenders-that is, if the majority's assertion of lesser
culpability on the part of the mentally retarded is valid.'58
Justice Scalia characterized the majority's use of opinion-based
evidence as "the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabri-
cate 'national consensus.""59 Justice Scalia termed these sources
"irrelevant" in the matter of determining national consensus.'
Specifically, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court's determi-
nations are based on the Constitution and that "'the views of
other nations, however enlightened the Justices of [the] Court
may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans
through the Constitution."""'
2. A Tailored Ruling To Fit the Majority's Personal View
Finally, Justice Scalia discussed his principal objection to the
holding in Atkins-that the majority ruling was not justified by a
national consensus, but instead was the result of the Justices
placing their personal opinions above all else in an effort to shape
the Eighth Amendment to fit their own personal ideologies.162
Justice Scalia believed this personal bias to be evident in the ma-
jority's assertion that "[their] own judgment will be brought to
bear" concerning the issue.163 In Justice Scalia's view, that inter-
pretation of the Eighth Amendment suggests "that really good
lawyers have moral sentiments superior to those of the common
herd, whether in 1791 or today."'64 Moreover, he argued that the
Court is a tiny, unrepresentative portion of society wrongfully
imposing its own perceptions of decency upon the nation.'65
157. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)).
158. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 374 (1989)).
159. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69
n.4 (1988)).
162. See id. at 2265 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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To that end, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's view was
incorrect as to whether the execution of the mentally retarded ful-
fills the goals of the death penalty.166 Justice Scalia asserted that
the majority's opinion "rests on two fundamental assumptions: (1)
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive punishments,
and (2) that sentencing juries or judges are unable to account
properly for the 'diminished capacities' of the retarded.' 67 In re-
sponse to the first assumption, Justice Scalia argued that a tem-
porary consensus should not create a permanent limit on an ac-
ceptable punishment under the Eighth Amendment.'68 Regarding
the second assumption, Justice Scalia railed against the limita-
tion on the judge and jury, which play an indispensable role in
the American justice system. 169
Moreover, Justice Scalia argued that the majority misinter-
preted the application of the death penalty's social purposes.'7 °
Furthermore, he pointed out that the majority left out one of the
death penalty's social purposes-incapacitation.'' Justice Scalia
asserted that the imposition of the death penalty for mentally re-
tarded offenders clearly meets this social purpose. 2 As to
whether retribution-one of the social purposes the majority ex-
amined-is satisfied, Justice Scalia argued that culpability and
the imposition of retribution may be satisfied.'73 Specifically, he
asserted that retribution is not determined solely by the mental
capacity of the offender, but also by the depravity of the crime.'74
Therefore, he argued that there should not be a categorical rule
as the majority suggests, but rather, the sentence should be left
to the judge and jury so that the specific facts of each case can be
reviewed.'75 In addition, Justice Scalia argued that the deterrent
purpose can also be met by imposing the death penalty upon the
166. Id. at 2265-67 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2265 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-90
(1991)).
169. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2265-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Cf id. at 2265 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority "conveniently"
avoided the issue of incapacitation).
173. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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mentally retarded.'76 Justice Scalia suggested that the purpose of
deterrence is met even if it only deters many, not all, of the tar-
geted group.'77 Specifically, he emphasized that "the Court does
not say that all mentally retarded individuals cannot 'process the
information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and...
control their conduct based upon that information,' [but] merely
asserts that they are 'less likely' to be able to do so." 7 ' Once
again, Justice Scalia concluded that since the death penalty may
have a deterrent effect for some mentally retarded individuals,
the safest course is to leave the punishment and culpability of
any such offenders up to the judge or jury.7 9
Finally, Justice Scalia asserted that the majority's argument-
that mentally retarded offenders face an enhanced risk of wrong-
ful execution due to their diminished capacities-is not logical be-
cause many defendants face the same enhanced risk due to other
factors (i.e., lack of intelligence and inability to articulate).1 80
Moreover, Justice Scalia suggested that continuing to allow men-
tal retardation as a mitigating factor is a better course of action
because the symptoms of mental retardation are easy to feign. 8'
If an offender gains acquittal by feigning mental retardation, he
or she does not face the possibility of confinement to a mental in-
stitution, like those persons claiming insanity, when it comes
time to re-enter society.8 2
IV. DESPITE A VALID TEST, THE ATKINS HOLDING IS
INHERENTLY FLAWED
The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."'' 3 When considering whether a punish-
ment is constitutional, the Eighth Amendment's ban adheres to
those punishments considered cruel and unusual in 1789, when
176. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2251).
179. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2267 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. See id. at 2267-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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the Bill of Rights was adopted.184 In addition, the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment "recog-
nizes the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.' 185 To determine such "evolving standards," it
is necessary to examine objective evidence of contemporary views
on punishment. 8 6 Thus, the Atkins Court was correct to review
evidence concerning the possibility of a national consensus
against the execution of the mentally retarded.8 7
The Court's finding that such a national consensus exists and
its subsequent ruling that it is cruel and unusual punishment to
execute a mentally retarded person effectively ends the common
law allowance of the death penalty as a possible punishment for
the moderate to mildly retarded."88 It is impossible to argue that
the Court's opinion is entirely invalid. After all, the ruling does
reinforce the common law rule that "idiots" cannot be executed.1 89
The Court's ruling in Atkins is not beyond question, however, and
in fact has two inherent problems: (1) the Court's basis for finding
a national consensus against executing the mentally retarded;
and (2) the fact that the Court mandates a bright-line rule re-
garding mental retardation, when it is often impossible to make
such a concrete distinction concerning those whose abilities fall
within the borderline ranges.
A. A False Finding of National Consensus
First, the legislative actions determined by the Court to indi-
cate a national consensus would not traditionally mandate such a
184. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226
(1971) (Black, J., concurring).
185. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-31 (1989) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)).
186. Id. at 331; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982) (holding that a
court should examine a number of factors before determining whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (examining objective evi-
dence to determine whether death is an acceptable penalty for rape).
187. For a complete discussion of the Court's findings concerning the national consen-
sus against the execution of the mentally retarded, see supra Part III.B.2.
188. For a discussion of the common law rule regarding punishment of the mentally
retarded, see supra Part I.
189. Id.
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finding.19° The Court found that legislation enacted in eighteen
states-which restricted the availability of the death penalty for
the mentally retarded-indicated a national consensus against
executing the mentally retarded.19 Yet, those eighteen states
comprise only forty-seven percent of the thirty-eight states that
allow capital punishment, and only seven of the states actually
prohibit execution of the mentally retarded in all instances.
92
Traditionally, a much greater degree of agreement has been nec-
essary in order to find a national consensus.193 For example, in
Ford v. Wainwright'9 -which held execution of the insane to be
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment-the finding of a
national consensus was based on the fact that no state permitted
execution of the insane.19' In addition, a plurality of the Court
found evidence of national consensus in Thompson v. Oklahoma'96
due to the fact that there was a minimum age listed in eighteen
states' death penalty statutes and each required that the defen-
dant be sixteen years old at the time of the offense in order to be
eligible for the death penalty.' 97
Moreover, the Court's reliance on public opinion polls and the
opinions of other nations is misplaced. In determining whether
the Eighth Amendment invalidates certain forms of punishment
the Court should look only to the laws of the United States, legis-
lative actions taken by individual states, and the sentencing ac-
tions of juries.' 9' Other nations' opinions do not result from re-
190. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2262 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2248-49.
192. Id. at 2261 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The other eleven states, which prohibit execut-
ing the mentally retarded, enacted legislation which is not retroactive and only applies to
those defendants convicted or committing crimes after the effective date of the legislation.
Id.
193. Id. at 2262 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
195. Id. at 409-10.
196. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
197. Id. at 829. The Court also required a greater degree of national consensus in Coker
v. Georgia, declaring the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment in response to an
offender's raping a woman (only one state allowed such punishment at the time). 433 U.S.
584, 599 (1977). Similarly, in Enmund v. Florida, the Court declared that a person cannot
be subject to the death penalty for participation in a robbery when it was actually an ac-
complice who killed the victim. 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). The ruling relied heavily on the
fact that twenty-eight states (seventy-eight percent) of the states allowing imposition of
the death penalty did not permit the death penalty under similar circumstances. Id. at
789.
198. See supra Part III.D.
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view of the United States Constitution, state legislative action, or
the opinion of the United States populace.'99 Thus, the opinions of
other nations are irrelevant when determining the requirements
of the Eighth Amendment.
in addition, the Court should not place great emphasis on the
results of public opinion polls, as their results can be affected by
the targeted population, the questions asked, and the definitions
of relevant issues given to the poll's participants. °° As Justice
O'Connor stated in Penry, "[t]he public sentiment expressed in
these and other polls and resolutions may ultimately find expres-
sion in legislation, which is an objective indicator of contemporary
values upon which we can rely."20 1 Thus, public opinion polls
should not be given substantial weight in considering whether
there is a national consensus regarding execution of the mentally
retarded. Instead, one should look to enacted legislation as a reli-
able objective factor that represents a culmination of opinions
voiced to legislators. As the Court had already reviewed legisla-
tive action in Atkins, °2 it was redundant and unacceptable to
then review public opinion polls as objective indicators of national
consensus.
B. A Bright-Line Rule Applied to a Complicated Issue
Next, the Court's opinion is inherently flawed because it cre-
ates a bright-line rule where there is often no bright-line answer.
The Court bases its ruling that the national consensus is correct,
at least in part, on the idea that execution of the mentally re-
tarded does not meet the social purposes of the death penalty.2 3
To a certain extent this argument is true. Some mentally re-
tarded offenders are less morally culpable due to the level of their
retardation and do not understand the consequences of their ac-
tions. The execution of these offenders fails to promote either of
the primary goals of the death penalty: retribution and deter-
rence. For the individual whose retardation results in an unques-
199. For further discussion of the irrelevancy of the opinion of other nations, see supra
Part III.C and Part III.D.1.
200. For further discussion of polls and issues, see supra Part III.C and Part III.D.1.
201. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989).
202. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2248-50 (2002).
203. See id. at 2250-52.
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tionable inability to learn from experience, communicate effec-
tively, and control actions, there can be no retributive or deter-
rent effect by imposing the death penalty. 24 The problem with the
majority's ruling arises, however, from the fact that "[alll persons
diagnosed with mental retardation vary in both ability to reason
and to adapt to life circumstances. 2 5
The variation within the abilities of those who are mentally re-
tarded suggests that the Court should have considered a catego-
rized ruling, instead of a bright-line ruling that eliminates the
question of whether the death penalty is ever applicable to men-
tally retarded individuals. The problem arises when a person
claiming to be mentally retarded is found competent to stand
trial. When a person is found competent to stand trial, it means
that he has "the ability to consult with his lawyer with a reason-
able degree of rational understanding, and was found to have a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him."20 6 Thus, being found competent to stand trial sug-
gests that the mentally retarded offender understands the crimi-
nal actions he or she took and the criminal proceedings brought
against him or her as a result. The problem is that the culpability
of a mentally retarded offender who is found competent to stand
trial is much greater than a mentally retarded offender who
lacked the competence to stand trial-meaning that the level of
moral culpability among the mentally retarded varies.
Just as the abilities and competence of the mentally retarded
vary, whether or not their actions and abilities fulfill the social
purposes set out by the death penalty must also vary. As Justice
Scalia asserts, the goal of retribution is determined by both the
mental capacity of the offender and the depravity of the crime.20 7
Since the factfinder sees the specific facts and circumstances of
each case and is in a better position to judge the offender's culpa-
bility, it would make more sense to have the factfinder decide
whether or not to impose the death penalty in cases where the
mentally retarded offender is competent to stand trial.208
204. For further discussion of why the inabilities of those with mental retardation re-
sult in the lack of retributive or deterrent effect, see supra Part III.B.3.
205. Borromeo, supra note 7, at 180.
206. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333.
207. See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In addition, the goal of deterrence is met in some cases involv-
ing the mentally retarded. Since the effects of mental retardation
vary among individuals, some of these individuals are capable of
understanding the consequences of their actions and the possible
punishment.2 °9 Once again, the varied ability present among the
mentally retarded suggests that borderline cases should be left to
the factfinder to determine the appropriate punishment because
they are in a better position to interpret the particular facts of a
certain case.
In its effort to prove that there is a national consensus against
execution of the mentally retarded, the Court points out that the
death penalty is rarely given to a mentally retarded offender.210
But, in fact, such rarity suggests that juries take their responsi-
bility seriously. Keeping mental retardation in mind as a mitigat-
ing factor, they look closely at the facts of the case in an effort to
provide just punishment based upon the offender's moral culpa-
bility and understanding of his or her actions. In borderline cases
such scrutiny is necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's ruling appears simple; it is unconstitutional to exe-
cute the mentally retarded.21' Yet, there are several problems
that will materialize once the states begin to apply Atkins. First,
the Court does not define "mental retardation." The lack of a set
standard will lead to varied definitions of mental retardation
throughout the nation. This, in turn, will mean that persons con-
sidered mentally retarded in one state will not be classified as
mentally retarded in another state, raising equal protection is-
sues. Though the variance in definition is likely to be slight-a
difference of a point or two on the IQ scale-the result will be an
inconsistent application of the Court's ban on execution of the
mentally retarded. This will undermine the Court's ultimate goal,
as individuals with mental disabilities will face death due to the
heightened requirements of one state's definition.
209. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 2249.
211. Id. at 2252.
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Second, the Court's decision to sidestep the issue of determin-
ing actual mental retardation in borderline cases will result in a
divergence of state rules. The Court acknowledges potential dis-
agreement in determining whether an offender is mentally re-
tarded, and admits that some offenders will not be "so impaired
as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about
whom there is a national consensus [against execution]."212 The
Court's answer to this problem, however, is to let the states de-
vise appropriate means of applying the restriction on execution of
the mentally retarded.1 13 Consequently, the states will once again
diverge on the application of the Eighth Amendment's restriction
because they will not agree on the appropriate means of deter-
mining mental retardation for borderline defendants. Thus, the
Court should have limited its ruling and allowed juries to con-
tinue to perform their function of considering mental retardation
as a mitigating factor, at least in borderline cases.
Due to the Court's failure to define mental retardation, the
United States Congress or the Supreme Court will be forced to
revisit the Atkins holding and apply a set standard so that men-
tally retarded offenders are afforded a level, consistent playing
field.
Jaime L. Henshaw
212. Id. at 2250.
213. See id. (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405,416-17 (1986)).
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